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worthiness. In the Slochower opinion, the Supreme Court asserted that the
"invocation of the privilege ...would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its
exercise would be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or conclusive
presumption of perjury." The Court of Appeals, declared that the raising of the
privilege is evidence of doubtful trust which is the basis of discharge, and not
the invocation of the fourteenth amendment. The validity of this semantic
distinction will soon be tested, since this decision now rests on the docket of the
Supreme Court. Dismissal based solely upon the invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination presents a grave constitutional problem involving the
scope and reach of the due process clause.
Civil Righs-Discrimination In Public Places
Under section 40 of the Civil Rights Law, no person can be excluded from
places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement because of race, color,
creed, or place of national origin. This restriction does not apply, however, to
institutions, clubs, or places of accommodation that are distinctly private. Two
questions thus arise when an individual is denied access to a certain establishment.
Was such access refused because of the individual's race, color, creed, or place of
national origin? Was the establishment public as distinguished from private?
Affirmative answers to these questions in a certain situation clearly demonstrate
a violation of the Civil Rights Act. Such a conclusion was reached by the Court
of Appeals in Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury55 in affirming the order of the
Appellate Division.
In this case, the Castle Hill Beach Club, a membership corporation, refused
to sell to Mrs. Brown, a negro, season locker rights which would have entitled her
to use beach facilities. The Court of Appeals easily determined that the denial
of access to Mrs. Brown was solely because of her color. The real problem was
determining whether the Beach Club was a private or public amusement.
The Court's conclusion that the Beach Club was public leaves us with the
problem of how to distinguish between public and private establishments.
Generally it can be stated that public and private characteristics of a place of
amusement will be considered in their overall effect giving greater weight to
those features to which the public attention has been drawn. Whichever features
are predominant will determine the nature of the amusement facilities. 0 Moreover,
if the predominant purpose of creating private characteristics is to avoid the effect
of the Civil Rights Act, the court will probably feel more prone to label the
facilities public. This distinction is not entirely satisfactory as it leaves much to
55. 2 N.Y.2d 596, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
56. Cf. Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club, 28 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1941), aif'd,
263 App. Div. 710, 31 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1st Dep't 1941), uppeal denied 263 App. Div.
870, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 577, 43 N.E.2d 716 (1942).
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guesswork', 7 However, the law on the subject is clear, statutorily5 s and judicially.59
The guesswork lies in interpreting each case by its particular facts. This disadvan-
tage, if it is one, can only be explained as another cost of our democratic legal
system.
Jurisdiction Of State Court Not Pre-Empfed By National Housing Act
Promoters of a corporation are liable to the corporation, when they perform
a transaction out of which they obtain a profit, if at the time of the transaction,
it is definitely intended or contemplated by the promoters that stock will be sold
to the uninformed public.60
Plaintiffs in Northridge Cooperative v. 32nd Avenue Construction Corpora-
tion,o' brought actions in behalf of corporations of which they were shareholders,
against the promoters of the enterprises for an accounting to the corporations of
profits made by the promoters before the plaintiffs subscribed to the stock of the
corporations. The basic issue was whether the National Housing Act62 precluded
the prosecution of an action of this nature in the state courts.
The federal government is supreme when it is acting within the limits set
by the Constitution.6 3 States are sovereign in our system of government except
where Congress takes away their authority in the exercise of its delegated powers.
64
"If the congressional enactment occupies the field, its control by the Supremacy
Clause supersedes or in the current phrase, pre-empts state power."65 Congress
may occupy only a limited portion of the field if it wishes. 6
In the absence of specific congressional indication that federal legislation is
to be exclusive, 67 the courts, in a case of this nature, have to determine what the
57. A golf club's characteristics were compared with its public character-
istics, the court deciding that the club was private. See Delaney v. Central
Valley Golf Club, supra note 56.
58. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTs LAW §40.
59. Norman v. City Island Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y.S. 379 (Sup. Ct.
1926); People v. King, 10 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888); Camp of the Pines v.
New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Pickett v.
Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926); Balden v. Grand Rapids Operating
Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927).
60. The leading case is Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphates Company,
3 App. Cas. 1218 (1878); 1 FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRAToN, §§192, 196 (Revised
and permanent edition, 1931).
61. Northridge Cooperative v. 32nd Avenue Construction Corporation, 2
N.Y.2d 514, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957).
62. National Housing Act, 48 STAT. 1246 (1934), as amended 12 U.S.C.
§§1713(b) (2), 1715(e).
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
64. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
65. Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S. 266, 271 (1956).
66. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
67. Andreance v. Lorentzen, 60 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
